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A RETURN TO CERTAINTY: WHY GRAND JURY
SUBPOENAS SHOULD SUPERSEDE CIVIL

PROTECTIVE ORDERS
An uncertainprivilege, or one which purports to be certainbut resuits in widely varying applicationsby the courts, is little better than no
privilege at all.'

I. INTRODUCTION
Civil protective orders have become commonplace in today's society where parties are increasingly concerned with keeping their disputes
private and foreclosing the potential for future liability.: Along with the
widespread use of civil protective orders though, the grand jury co-exists
as an entity with broad investigative powers, including the ability to obtain
a subpoena from a presiding court.3 Grand jury subpoenas often request
evidence previously shielded by a civil protective order issued in a separate
matter.4 At this critical juncture, an individual's expectation of privacy
derived from a civil protective order directly conflicts with the historical
and judicial imperatives of the grand jury. 5 During the twenty-four years
since the courts first addressed this conflict, the various circuits of the
1 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981).
2 See Frederick N. Egler, Jr., Can You Keep a Secret? Preserving Confidentiality in
Life, Health & Disabling Litigation, 29 THE BRIEF 8, 10 (2000) (discussing role of protective orders in preserving commercial and private information); see also Laurie Kratky Dore,
Secrecy by Consent: The Use and Limits of Confidentiality in the Pursuitof Settlement, 74
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 283, 285 (1999) (describing protective orders as furthering modem
civil litigation's overall secretive nature).
3 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 687-88 (1972) (describing ability to subpoena witnesses as essential to grand jury's historic function); see also United States v.
Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 48-49 (1992) (acknowledging relationship between grand jury and
presiding court in compelling witnesses). The Court specifically stated, "the grand jury
cannot compel the appearance of witnesses and the production of evidence, and must appeal
to the court when such compulsion is required." Id.
4 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 138 F.3d 442, 443 (1st Cir. 1998) (stating
factual conflict between current subpoena and prior protective order); United States v. Janet
Greeson's A Place for Us, Inc. (In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served on Meserve, Mumper &
Hughes), 62 F.3d 1222, 1223 (9th Cir. 1995) (describing conflict between protective order
in insurance suit and pending grand jury subpoena); Palmieri v. New York, 779 F.2d 861,
863-64 (2d Cir. 1985) (establishing facts surrounding conflict between civil protective order
and grand jury subpoena).
5 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d 1468, 1471 (4th Cir. 1988) (stating
analysis of conflict involves consideration of three interests).
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United States Court of Appeals have wavered between three different standards in resolving the matter.6
The purpose of this note is to analyze the current standards used in
resolving conflicts between grand jury subpoenas and civil protective orders, and to advocate for an absolute standard in favor of grand jury subpoenas. Part II of this note discusses and evaluates the three competing
interests involved in the conflict between protective orders and grand jury
subpoenas. In evaluating these competing interests, this note asserts that
the concern surrounding any abrogation of the privilege against selfincrimination by sustaining a grand jury subpoena is unwarranted and misplaced. Part III examines and details the multiple standards the courts of
appeals have adopted. Finally, Part IV critiques the three current standards
and concludes that the compelling need test is fundamentally improper and
that the modified per se rule is both unnecessary and impractical. The
courts should adhere to the per se rule that the Fourth Circuit first announced, whereby civil protective orders must give way to grand jury subpoenas.
II. BACKGROUND
Any analysis of the conflict between civil protective orders and
grand jury subpoenas must begin with a consideration of the three primary
interests at stake.7
A. Effective and Efficient Dispute Resolution
In considering the primacy of a grand jury subpoena over a civil
protective order, the interest most directly affected is the goal of maintaining an efficient and effective legal system.8 In furthering this goal, civil
protective orders serve to shield parties and witnesses involved in civil
litigation from the broad discovery power that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (FRCP) authorize. 9 To mitigate the harmful effects of broad
See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 138 F.3d at 445 (stating subpoena prevails unless
exceptional circumstances compel otherwise); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at
1474 (adopting per se rule in favor of grand jury subpoena); Martindell v. Int'l Tel. and Tel.
Corp., 594 F.2d 291, 296 (2d Cir. 1979) (stating protective order prevails absent compelling
need or improvidence in issuance).
7 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1471 (stating three competing interests
involved in determining grand jury's authority); see also In re Grand Jury, 286 F.3d 153,
158-62 (3d Cir. 2002) (analyzing conflicting interests in upholding subpoena).
8 See FED. R. Civ. P. 1 (stating scope and purpose of rules). The rule states in relevant part that the Rules "shall be construed ... to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action." Id.
6

9 See United States v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 666 F.2d 364, 368-69 (9th Cir.
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discovery, the 1970 amendments to the FRCP established protective orders
to balance the Federal Rules' liberal approach to discovery against the
paramount concern of parties' privacy and confidentiality.'° Essentially, a
court will issue a protective order that limits discovery in a matter when
the parties have shown "good cause" for requiring such an order." Therefore, upon showing "good cause" a court may restrict the scope of information obtained through discovery, thereby encouraging litigants
to testify
2
and to avoid invoking any hindering testimonial privileges. 1
Although civil protective orders further the goal of effective and efficient dispute resolution, courts possess other tools that further the same
goal, notwithstanding a party's assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. 1 3 One such alternative available to a court is to
stay potentially harmful discovery until the completion of all relevant
grand jury investigations or until the relevant statute of limitations has
lapsed. 14 Moreover, any assertion of an individual's Fifth Amendment
1982) (stating purpose behind civil protective orders); 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR
R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2036 (2d ed. 1994) (explaining goals and
purposes behind issuing civil protective orders). Rule 26(b)(1) defines the scope of discovery in civil litigation in broad terms and includes "any matter, not privileged, that is relevant
to the claim or defense of any party, including the existence, description, nature, custody,
condition, and location of any books, documents, or tangible things and the identity and
location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter." FED. R. CIv. P.
26(b)( 1).
10See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 34 (1984) (stating protective
orders necessary consequence of broad discovery); Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the Courts, 105 HARv. L. REv. 427, 441 (1991) (describing importance and purpose of civil protective orders).
11 See FED. R. CIv. P. 26(c). The Rule states in relevant part: "for good cause shown,
the court may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense." Id.
12 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1472 (admitting value of protective
orders in facilitating resolution of civil disputes); Martindell v. Int'l Tel. and Tel. Corp., 594
F.2d 291, 295-96 (2d Cir. 1979) (arguing protective orders discourage assertions of testimonial privileges and maintain trial efficiency); Miller, supra note 10, at 483 (describing
impact of protective orders on litigation system). In terms of discovery, "[t]he importance
of protective orders lies in their usefulness in safeguarding litigants against many of the
damaging side effects of discovery while still facilitating that process." Id.
13 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1476 (asserting courts possess alternative tools to ensure effective litigation); Robert Heidt, The Conjurer's Circle: The Fifth
Amendment Privilege in Civil Cases, 91 YALE L. J. 1062, 1065-71 (1982) (describing alternatives available to courts when parties invoke testimonial privileges).
14 See Shaffer v. United States, 528 F.2d 920, 922 (4th Cir. 1975) (suggesting
government either provide immunity or stay discovery until statute of limitations has lapsed).
Shaffer filed suit against the government in an attempt to attain a refund and abatement of
his tax liability on his wagering income. Id. at 921-22. At the same time, however, Shaffer
was under indictment for federal gambling charges and consequently invoked his Fifth
Amendment privilege. Id. Rather than dismiss the case and deprive Shaffer of his right to
sue, the court of appeals ordered the district court to stay the proceeding until the government either offered immunity or until the statute of limitations had lapsed. Id. at 922.
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privilege against self-incrimination must be justified and pass constitutional muster.15 Another alternative to ensuring the integrity of civil litigation is to shift the burden of proof to the asserting defendant, especially
when a defendant's assertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege significantly affects the plaintiffs ability to present a prima facie case. 16 These
alternatives, as well as the permissible inferences in a civil action from a
defendant's assertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege, accomplish
the
17
same goal of providing an efficient and effective legal system.
B. The Origins and Authority of the GrandJury
As an institution, grand juries date back to medieval England during
the reign of King Henry 1I, and they most recently received their mandate
from the United States Constitution. 8 The primary function of the grand
jury is to "provide a fair method for instituting criminal proceedings
against persons believed to have committed crimes."' 19 Furthermore, because the grand jury derives its authority from the Bill of Rights rather than
the power-granting Articles of the Constitution, courts have declared that
the grand jury is "a constitutional fixture in its own right. ' ' 20 In its role as a
vehicle for instigating criminal proceedings and its constitutional mandate,
the grand jury exists today as an investigative body independent of both
governmental and individual interference. 1
15 See Nat'l Acceptance Co. v. Bathalter, 705 F.2d 924, 927 (7th Cir. 1983) (stressing

judge must deem party's assertion of privilege justified). Though the threshold showing for
a valid assertion is minimal, the assertion must be based on something more than "a fanciful
possibility of prosecution." In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation, 609 F.2d 867, 871
(7th Cir. 1979).
16 See United States v. N.Y., New Haven, & Hartford R.R. Co., 355 U.S. 253, 256 n.5
(1957); Commercial Molasses Corp. v. N.Y. Tank Barge Corp., 314 U.S. 104, 111 (1941)
(stating burden placed on defendant with peculiar knowledge of fact to come forward); Ajit
V. Pai, Comment, Should a Grand Jury Subpoena Override a District Court's Protective
Order?, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 317, 339 (1997) (arguing burden shifting prevents successful
bad faith invocations of privilege); Heidt, supra note 13, at 1107-08.
17 See In re GrandJury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1476 (stating effectiveness of
alternatives in maintaining efficient judicial system).
18 See U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment states in relevant part: "[n]o
person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury." Id. See R. H. Helmholz, The Early History of the
Grand Jury and the Canon Law, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 613, 613 (1983) (pointing to Assize of
Clarendon as grand jury's first appearance).
19 Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1956) (detailing history and function
of grand jury in United States).
20 United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306, 1312 (9th Cir. 1977) (quoting Nixon
v.
Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 712 n.54 (1973)); see also supra note 18; United States v. Williams,
504 U.S. 36, 47 (1992) (discussing broad authority and power of grand jury).
21 Williams, 504 U.S. at 47 (describing independence and autonomy of grand jury
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History and the United States Constitution require that a grand jury
be given broad investigative powers, including the authority to compel the
production of evidence and testimony through subpoenas.2 2 The broad and
expansive role of the grand jury in today's society is evident in the Su-

preme Court's reluctance to hinder its function by refusing to require the
inclusion of some fundamental evidentiary rules in grand jury proceedings.23 This unfettered power and lack of judicial restrictions are consistent with the principle that the grand jury exists as an investigative body
wholly independent from the judiciary.24 In the face of a protective order

aimed essentially at precluding a grand jury from having access to certain
evidence, failing to uphold a grand jury subpoena substantially limits2 5its

independence and frustrates it goal of attaining "every man's evidence.
investigations). In Williams, Justice Scalia observed:

[Tihe whole theory of its function is that it belongs to no branch of the institutional Government, serving as a kind of buffer or referee between the Government and the people. Although the grand jury normally operates, of course, in the
courthouse and under judicial auspices, its institutional relationship with the judicial branch has traditionally been ...

at arm's length.

Id. See also United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974) (highlighting latitude and
independence afforded to grand jury); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962) (describing historical significance of grand jury).
22 See U.S. CONST. amend. V; FED. R. CRIM. P. 6 (outlining role and function of grand
jury); Williams, 504 U.S. at 48 (arguing grand jury's independence evident in broad scope
of power to investigate wrongdoings); Calandra,414 U.S. at 343 (describing vital function
of grand jury in legal system); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 668 (1972) (stressing
fundamental principles involved in function of grand jury). The scope of a grand jury's
authority has been encapsulated by the maxim that "the public ... has a right to every
man's evidence." United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950). See also Roger Roots,
If It's Not a Runaway, It's Not a Real Grand Jury, 33 CREIGHTON L. REV. 821, 825 (2000)
(suggesting grand jury should possess even broader investigative powers).
23 See Calandra, 414 U.S. at 349-50 (refusing to extend exclusionary
rule to grand
jury proceedings). The Court stated that extending the exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings would create disputes that "would halt the orderly progress of an investigation and
might necessitate extended litigation of issues only tangentially related to the grand jury's
primary objective." Id. See, e.g., Williams, 504 U.S. at 55 (stating no requirement prosecutor disclose exculpatory evidence to grand jury); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 15
(1973) (declaring no need for showing of reasonableness by grand jury in issuing subpoena); Costello, 350 U.S. at 364 (refusing to require application of hearsay rule in grand
jury proceedings).
24 Williams, 504 U.S. at 48 (stating grand jury generally free from interference by
presiding judge); Calandra, 414 U.S. at 343 (emphasizing judge does not preside over or
monitor grand jury proceedings).
25 See United States v. Janet Greeson's A Place for Us, Inc. (In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served on Meserve, Mumper & Hughes), 62 F.3d 1222, 1226-27 (9th Cir. 1995)
(stating concern with judicial interference into grand jury proceedings by upholding protective orders); Williams v. United States (In re Grand Jury Proceedings), 995 F.2d 1013, 1016
(11 th Cir. 1993) (recognizing significant interest in grand jury's need for information and
independence); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d 1468, 1474 (4th Cir. 1988) (stating
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C. Fifth Amendment Concerns

Just as important as the potential for unwarranted interference with
grand jury proceedings, the conflict between a civil protective order and
grand jury subpoena raises concerns about an individual's privilege against
self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment.26 Given that protective
orders serve as an instrument to preserve confidentiality, courts issue a
large number of protective orders to induce deponents to testify or give
evidence that they would otherwise avoid offering by invoking their Fifth
Amendment privilege.27 Using protective orders to preserve a deponent's
confidentiality creates the false impression that the deponent has exercised
his privilege. As a result, courts have argued that allowing a grand jury
subpoena to trump a protective order abrogates the deponent's Fifth
Amendment privilege.28 This concern is misplaced for two reasons: (1)
protective orders cannot functionally and absolutely preserve a deponent's
confidentiality; and (2) the judiciary cannot authorize de facto grants of
immunity via protective orders. 29

protective order would interfere with grand jury investigation).
26

See, e.g., Janet Greeson's A Placefor Us, Inc., 62 F.3d at 1224-25 (outlining Fifth

Amendment implications); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1471 (recognizing
possibility for Fifth Amendment implications in analyzing validity of grand jury subpoena);
Martindell v. Int'l Tel. and Tel. Corp., 594 F.2d 291, 297 (2d Cir. 1979) (declining to rule
on Fifth Amendment issues after upholding protective order).
27 See Williams, 995 F.2d at 1014 (stating Williams' motivation in moving
for protective order to avoid possible self-incrimination); see also Pai, supra note 16, at 331 (stating
primary function of protective orders is to induce deponents to testify).
28 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1479 (Sprouse, J., dissenting).
Expressing its concerns regarding potential Fifth Amendment implications, the dissent stated
that the deponent "testified only in reliance on the district court's pledge to protect their
potentially self-incriminating remarks from the grand jury." Id. See also Martindell, 594
F.2d at 296-97 (distinguishing facts based on deponents reliance on confidentiality provision contained in protective order). But see In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 147475 (stressing protective orders not substitute for Fifth Amendment privilege and not affected by subpoena).
29 See, e.g., Janet Greeson's A Place for Us, Inc., 62 F.3d at 1225-26 (reiterating
shortcomings of protective orders in safeguarding deponents' Fifth Amendment rights);
Williams, 995 F.2d at 1015 (summarizing district court's reasoning in upholding protective
order); In re GrandJury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1475-476 (citing judiciary's lack of authority and potential flaws in protective orders). The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected
the district court's assertion that the protective order prevailed "because Williams relied on
the Rule 26(c) protective order and waived his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, he
was entitled to have the order enforced." Williams, 995 F.2d at 1015. See also Pai, supra
note 16, at 331-33 (arguing concern about deponent's Fifth Amendment rights misplaced).
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1. Protective orders are not absolute and cannot be used as a substitute for an individual's invocation of his or her Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination.
Although protective orders are similar to the privilege against selfincrimination in that they provide a deponent with expectations of confidentiality and privacy, protective orders are "not a substitute for invocation
of the Fifth Amendment privilege." 30 Protective orders are not synonymous with the privilege against self-incrimination and grants of immunity
primarily because protective orders cannot absolutely prevent confidential
information from being disclosed.3' Unfortunately, protective orders that
successfully induce a deponent to reveal incriminating information are
always susceptible to run a party leaking the information to the public or to
law enforcement officials. 32 Once the incriminating or confidential information is leaked, a protective order cannot guarantee that the government
will not use the information against the deponent. 33 Furthermore, the issuIn re Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1475.
31 See Janet Greeson's A Place For Us, Inc., 62 F.3d at 1224-25 (summarizing reasons why individuals cannot totally rely on protection of protective orders); In re Grand
Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1476 (discussing ways in which protective orders fail to act
similar to privilege against self-incrimination); WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 9, at § 2018
(expressing doubt as to whether court could tailor order to degree of statutory immunity);
cf In re Grand Jury, 286 F.3d 153, 160 (2002) (quoting Martindell, 594 F.2d at 295). The
court stated that "[w]hile protective orders are in many cases important facilitating devices,
they are not, as the Second Circuit describes them, part of the 'cornerstone of our administration of civil justice,' and should almost always yield in the face of a grand jury subpoena." Id.
32 See In re GrandJury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1476 (detailing risk of leaks of
information and evidence to public); see also Grove Fresh Distribs., Inc. v. John Labatt, Ltd.,
No. 95-2603, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 1836, at *10 (7th Cir. Feb. 5, 1998) (stating record
clearly indicated attempts of individual to leak information and violate confidentiality);
Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219, 222, 227 (6th Cir. 1996) (stating
facts where sealed documents under protective order were leaked to Business Week journalist).
33 See Janet Greeson's A Place For Us, Inc., 62 F.3d at 1225 (cautioning against
presumptuous reliance on protective orders); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1476
(noting lack of assurance of immunity in protective orders); Heidt, supra note 13, at 1095
(stating protective orders always susceptible to violation by parties). In distinguishing the
assurances provided by a grant of immunity, Heidt observed:
30

a protective order in a civil case carries no similar assurance. Such an order allows the response, or at least information derived from the response, to spill out at
trial, appeal, or some other hearing, where it could be discovered and later used
by prosecutors. No protective order could provide the absolute protection ... required against direct or indirect use by prosecutors. The court can hardly hold all
proceedings-including the trial and appeal-in secret, seal all records indefinitely, and prevent all participants from supplying information to the government.
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ing court can always modify a protective order, although the standard for
determining the propriety of such a modification is vague.34 Additionally,
civil protective orders are merely "stopgap" measures in the discovery
process because they will become ineffective when the incriminating information is revealed at trial.35 Perhaps the most compelling evidence that
protective orders do not equate to the privilege against self-incrimination is
that deponents often assert their Fifth Amendment privilege
even though
36
they already obtained a protective order in the same matter.
2. Protective orders are valid only to the extent that they do not violate any statute or the separation of powers doctrine.
A civil deponent has only two options to preserve his privilege
against self-incrimination: assert the Fifth Amendment privilege or seek
immunity from the government. 37 In attempting to seek immunity, the
power and discretion to award such protection rests exclusively with the
executive branch of the government.3 8 When a court upholds a protective
order in the face of a grand jury subpoena, the deponent is protected from

34See Martindell, 594 F.2d at 296 (enunciating compelling need rule). Specifically, a
protective order will not be modified "absent a showing of improvidence in the grant of
[the] order or some extraordinary circumstance or compelling need." Id. See also United
States v. Davis, 702 F.2d 418 (2d Cir. 1983) (explaining types of extraordinary circumstances under standard).
35See In re Grand Jury, 286 F.3d at 161 (summarizing degree of protection of protective orders); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1476 (stating protective orders often

act as temporary benefits to litigants). Most recently, the Third Circuit, elaborating on the
temporary protection that protective orders afford stated, "deponents who have reason to
fear not just embarrassment or economic disadvantage, but possible criminal charges as
well, should be aware that a protective order alone cannot protect them from a grand jury
investigation. Id.
36 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1476 (distinguishing protective orders
based on their ineffectiveness on deponent's right to exercise privilege).
" See 18 U.S.C. § 6003 (2002) (authorizing immunity to compel testimony shielded
by witnesses assertion of Fifth Amendment privilege). The statute states in relevant part:
"In the case of any individual who has been called to testify... the United States District
Court... shall issue ...an order requiring such individual to give testimony... which he
refuses to give.., on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination." Id. See generally Pai, supra note 16, at 332 (describing viable options to witnesses in preserving privilege against self-incrimination).
8 See § 6003 (stating order compelling testimony given only on request of Unites
States Attorney); Pillsbury v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 261 (1983) (stating power to grant
immunity rests in hands of executive); Janet Greeson's A Place For Us, Inc., 62 F.3d at
1224 (recognizing power to grant immunity rests in executive branch under federal law).
"No court has authority to immunize a witness. That responsibility, as we have noted, is
peculiarly an executive one, and only the Attorney General or a designated officer of the
Department of Justice has authority to grant use immunity." Id.
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any related criminal investigation.39 In other words, the judiciary has essentially given the deponent immunity, at least temporarily. 40 Although
protective orders preserve a deponent's confidentiality, they cannot act as
de facto grants of immunity in the face of a grand jury subpoena, and
therefore, upholding a grand jury subpoena does not abrogate a person's
Fifth Amendment rights.41
III. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
Since the courts first addressed the conflict between protective orders and grand jury subpoenas in 1979, the federal courts of appeals have
created three separate and distinct legal standards, each attempting to strike
the proper balance among three competing interests.42
A. The Compelling Need Standard
In Martindell v. International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation,43 the Second Circuit addressed the conflict between a civil protective
order and the government's interest in gaining access to the information
that the order protects. 44 Martindell arose in the context of a stockholders'
derivative suit alleging that certain officers and directors of International
Telephone and Telegraph Corporation had wasted the company's assets in
an effort to influence the 1970 elections in Chile.45 During litigation, the
plaintiffs deposed several witnesses under a protective order that limited
use of the transcripts exclusively to pending litigation. 46 Subsequently and
39 See Janet Greeson's A Place For Us, Inc., 62 F.3d at 1224 (declaring civil protec-

tive order de facto grants of immunity when upheld over grand jury subpoenas); Williams
v. United States (In re Grand Jury Proceedings), 995 F.2d 1013,1015 (describing how
protective orders relate to immunity); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1475 (11 th
Cir. 1993) (stating how deponents desired de facto grant of immunity by attaining protective order).
40 See Janet Greeson'sA Place For Us, Inc., 62 F.3d at 1224.
41 See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text (discussing executive power to grant
immunity). In warning of the dangers of construing protective orders into grants of immunity, the court in In re Grand Jury Subpoena stated that doing so "would usurp the proper
authority of the executive branch to balance the public interest in confidentiality against the
interest in effective criminal investigation." 836 F.2d at 1475.
42 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 138 F.3d 445 (1st Cir. 1998) (creating modified per se rule); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1474 (establishing per se rule in
favor of grand jury subpoena); Martindell v. Int'l Tel. and Tel. Corp., 594 F.2d 291, 296 (2d
Cir. 1979) (creating compelling need standaid).
43 594 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1979).

44 Id. Specifically, the government sought access to the deposition transcripts for
subsequent use in its investigation into possible violations of federal law that included perjury, conspiracy, and obstruction of justice. Id. at 293.
45 See id. at 293.
46 See id.
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through an informal request to the presiding judge, the government sought
access to the protected transcripts for use in its investigation into suspected
violations of federal law.4 7 The district court denied the government's
request based on the deponent's reliance on the protective order and the
potential constitutional issues that complying with the government's request would raise. 48

On appeal, the Second Circuit upheld the district court's decision,
stating that the function of protective orders in securing "the just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination" of civil disputes "represents the cornerstone of our administration of civil justice. 'A9 Encouraging the full disclosure of all relevant evidence, the court stressed that failing to uphold protective orders would discourage witnesses from giving testimony and, consequently, undermine the civil litigation system. 50 Although the court recognized and considered law enforcement's interest in obtaining all relevant
evidence, the majority ultimately concluded that the government's broad
investigative powers included alternatives to the "exploitation of the fruits
of private litigation." 5' After balancing these competing interests, the court
stated the rule as follows: "absent a showing of improvidence in the grant
of a Rule 26(c) protective order or some extraordinary or compelling need.
•.a witness should be entitled to rely upon the enforceability of a protective order against any third parties. 52 By denying the government's unorthodox requests, the court fashioned a rule that other courts would subsequently utilize in analyzing grand jury subpoenas.5 3
In United States v. Davis,54 the Second Circuit elaborated on the
standard announced in Martindell by attempting to define exactly what
type of extraordinary circumstances would justify overriding a protective
order.55 Unlike Martindell, the court confronted a grand jury subpoena
47 See id. The government's request was based on the Justice Department's opinion
that the testimony was relevant at least to the credibility and truthfulness of the witnesses.
Id. The court noted the unusual method by which the government requested access to the
information and stated that the proper procedure was to either obtain a grand jury subpoena
for the information or to seek permissive intervention under Rule 24(b) of the FRCP. Id. at
294.
41 See Martindell, 594 F.2d at 293.

Id. at 295 (quoting

FED. R. Civ. P. 1).
See id. at 295.
51 Id. at 296 (quoting GAF Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 415 F. Supp. 129, 132
(S.D.N.Y. 1976)).
52 Id. at 296.
The court further explained the rule by stating that "such an order

49
50

should not be vacated or modified merely to accommodate the Government's desire to
inspect protected testimony for possible use in a criminal investigation, either as evidence
or as the subj
of a possible perjury charge." Id.
3 See almieri v. New York, 779 F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1985).
14 702 F.2d 418 (2d Cir. 1983).
55 See id. at 422-23 (distinguishing facts from Martindell).
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requesting access to transcripts from a deposition taken in accordance with
a limited protective order from a bankruptcy proceeding. 56 In permitting
access to the transcripts and documents, the Davis court made several distinctions from Martindell that arguably constitute extraordinary circumstances.57 In denying the deponent's argument to prohibit access to the
deposition transcripts, the court emphasized that the deponent had never
produced evidence of a formal protective order. 58 Furthermore, the deponent had failed to show that, but for the oral "understanding of confidentiality," he would not have testified. 59 Despite the written protective order
sealing various business documents, the court allowed the government
access because the terms of the order permitted the parties themselves to
disclose the documents, and because the documents were unprivileged and
created prior to the litigation. 60 Although the grand jury gained access to
the transcripts and business documents, the Second Circuit in Davis continued to abide by the compelling need rule, but with
some indication as to
61
circumstances.
extraordinary
constitute
might
what
Two years after Davis, in Palmieri v. New York, 62 the Second Circuit explicitly extended the compelling need rule to instances where the
government sought to modify a protective order or requested access to
documents via a grand jury subpoena.6 3 In this private antitrust action,
several defendants contested a district judge's order permitting the New
York Attorney General access to a settlement agreement and testimony
from the private action. 64 During discovery in the private litigation, a magistrate judge issued a protective order preventing disclosure "to any government agency or instrumentality" and indicated that the defendants had
56

See id. at 420-21 (setting forth facts of case). During the bankruptcy proceeding,

the deponents, after requesting a protective order, came to an "understanding" whereby
limited protection would be given only to those portions of the testimony that were later
labeled as confidential or accusatory. Id. Furthermore, the Bankruptcy Court issued a
written protective order that restricted access to and use of confidential information contained in business records belonging to the deponent. Id. However, the written order also
contained the following provision: "Nothing herein shall preclude IDT from disclosing any
confidential information to any person or entity." Id. at 420.
57 See id. at 423-24 (stating reasons why deponents reliance on Martindell is misplaced).
58 See id. at 422-23.
59 See id. (stating lack of formal protective order and evidence of reliance support
government's case). The court also stressed the fact that the deponent had failed to comply
with the terms of the "understanding of confidentiality" and that, unlike Martindell, the
government had demanded access in the usual form of a grand jury subpoena. Id.
60 See United States v. Davis, 702 F.2d 418, 423 (2d Cir. 1983) (refusing to enforce
written protective order).
61 See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
62 779 F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1985).
63 See id. at 863 (reciting facts involving motions to modify protective order and
grand jury subpoena).
64 See id. at 862 (reciting facts of case).
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relied significantly upon the order when testifying.65 Despite the protective
order, the Attorney General attempted to intervene in the action and obtain
a modification of the order, and shortly thereafter served a grand jury subpoena upon the plaintiff in the private action.6 6 Although the government
was enjoined from questioning the plaintiff in front of the grand jury, the
district court granted the Attorney General's motion to modify the order,
thereby enabling the government to have access to the settlement negotiations.67
In reversing the district court's order, the Second Circuit reaffirmed
the compelling need rule enunciated in Martindelland emphasized that the
deponents' had placed considerable reliance on the protective orders.68
The court, however, was unable to determine whether the district court
improvidently granted the sealing orders and therefore remanded the case
back to the district court. 6 9 The appeals court explained that if the magistrate judge, at the time he issued the order, "should have recognized that
the settlement would likely further criminal activity, then he acted improvidently in granting those orders." 70 Once again, the Second Circuit
reaffirmed the use of the compelling need rule and also attempted to
clarify
7'
circumstances.
exceptional
or
improvidence
what would constitute
The most recent case affirming the compelling need rule, United
States v. Doe,72 involved a grand jury subpoena ordering a court-appointed
bankruptcy examiner to submit as evidence all deposition transcripts and
unprivileged documents relating to Eastern Airlines' bankruptcy. 73 Eastern
Airlines filed for bankruptcy in March of 1989, and a court-appointed examiner conducted a detailed investigation into some of the Eastern's alleg65

ders).

66

See id. at 863-64 (stating grounds and circumstances surrounding protective orSee id. at 864 (describing government's actions in attempting to gain access to

information).
67 See Palmieri v. New York, 779 F.2d 861, 864 (2d Cir. 1985) (summarizing district
court's decision in granting government's motion).
68 See id. at 864-65 (noting increased burden for government in light of appellants'
heavy reliance). Specifically, the court viewed the appellants' reliance "as evidenced by
their unwillingness to engage in settlement negotiations without the protections afforded,
raises a presumption in favor of upholding those orders. Id. at 865.
69 See id. at 866 (indicating inability to determine if order wrongfully granted). The
government had argued that the settlement agreement itself was an act in furtherance of
criminal activity and that the order sealing the agreement was improvidently granted. Id. at
865.
70

Id. at 865.

71

See id. at 865-66 (reviewing record for evidence of improvidence or extraordinary

circumstances).
72 (In re Grand Jury Duces Tecum Dated April 19, 1991), 945 F.2d 1221 (2d Cir.
1991).
73

See id. at 1222-24 (outlining facts of district court proceedings).
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edly fraudulent transactions.74 Eastern asserted that because of its involvement in an intense labor dispute, it would not voluntarily comply with
the examiner unless the court guaranteed the confidentiality of all information obtained.75 As a result, the examiner, counsel for Eastern, and other
interested parties entered into a written stipulation to keep the depositions
confidential, which the court formalized under an order signed by the presiding judge. 76 Shortly thereafter, the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York obtained the grand jury subpoena ordering the
examiner to produce all specified documents and transcripts.77 The district
court denied the parties' motions to quash the subpoena, reasoning that the
order was an express agreement to withhold evidence
of a crime from the
78
government and therefore against public policy.
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the district court's order and
remanded the case, holding that the district court had mistakenly placed the
burden of proof on the examiner. 79 The court also stated that the district
court failed to make a finding as to whether the order was improvidently
granted or whether any extraordinary circumstances existed in the government's favor. 80 In reaching its conclusion, the Second Circuit responded to
the Fourth Circuit's criticism that upholding protective orders constituted
an improper grant of immunity by reiterating that a court can always modify a protective order when there is evidence of compelling need.8'
B. The PerSe Rule
The Fourth, Eleventh, and Ninth Circuits have all expressly rejected
the Martindell test and have held that grand jury subpoenas must prevail
over otherwise valid protective orders.82

74 See id. at 1222.
75 See id. (reciting facts indicated in record). The record also indicates that time was

of the essence in resolving the bankruptcy proceedings and that the examiner "was under
enormous pressure to expedite his investigation in the interests of creditors who were owed
billions of dollars, the traveling public and thousands of Eastern employees whose jobs
depended on a prompt reorganization." Id.
76 See id. at 1222-23 (reviewing stipulation and order issued by court).
77 United States v. Doe (In re Grand Jury Duces Tecum Dated April 19, 1991), 945
F.2d 1221, 1223 (2d Cir. 1991) (outlining procedural posture).
78 See id. at 1223 (summarizing district court's holding).
79 See id. at 1224 (stating grounds for remand).
80 See id.

81 See id. at 1224-25 (rejecting Fourth Circuit's per se rule).
82

See Janet Greeson's A Place For Us, Inc., 62 F.3d at 1227 (adopting per se rule

favoring grand jury subpoenas over protective orders); Williams v. United States (In re
Grand Jury Proceedings), 995 F.2d 1013, 1020 (4th Cir. 1988) (rejecting compelling need
rule); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d 1468, 1478 (4th Cir. 1988) (stating otherwise
valid protective order not enough to quash grand jury subpoena).
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1. Fourth Circuit - In re GrandJury Subpoena

83

The Fourth Circuit has only heard one case involving the conflict
between a protective order and a grand jury subpoena, and in that case the
84
court established the per se rule that two other circuits would later adopt.
The conflict arose after a district court refused to quash a grand jury subpoena ordering the plaintiffs' counsel to turn over protected deposition
transcripts from a previous civil insurance action. 85 The court, drawing on
Martindell and its progeny, recognized that the conflict required consideration of three competing interests: "the authority of a grand jury to gather
evidence in a criminal investigation; the deponents' right against selfincrimination; and the goals' 86of liberal discovery and efficient dispute resolution in civil proceedings."
The court first addressed the potential harm to the traditional role of
the grand jury if it upheld a protective order over a grand jury subpoena.87
Relying on grand juries' broad investigatory authority, the court concluded
that giving precedence to protective orders would compromise the principle that "[a] grand jury, subject only to the limitations of the Fifth
Amendment, has the right to all relevant evidence. 8 8 Specifically, the
court considered that, in practice, protective orders shield uncoerced, inconsistent testimony and, therefore, cannot continue to frustrate the government's need for this information. 89
The court disagreed with the deponents' assertions that their Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination was at risk, stating that "the
83 836 F.2d 1468 (4th Cir. 1988).

84See supra note 79.
85 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1469-70 (describing facts leading up
to appeal). Following the 1985 collapse of Community Savings & Loan (Community),
whose parent company was Equity Programs Investment Corporation (EPIC), a special
grand jury in the district of Maryland was established to investigate the circumstances surrounding the collapse. Id. The deponents, various officers and directors of EPIC, were
eventually deposed in connection with a civil suit by various mortgage insurance companies
who had been harmed by Community's collapse. Id. Prior to giving their testimony, the
deponents, after being denied a stay, attained a protective order that, among other things,
explicitly stated that "the sealed depositions ... shall not be made available to any state or
federal investigating agency or authority." Id. Following a hearing in a Maryland district
court, the judge denied the deponents motions to quash the subpoenas. Id. at 1470.
86 See id. at 1471 (laying out scope of analysis).
87 See id. at 1471 (describing historical powers and significance of grand jury).
88 See id. at 1474 (declaring balance must end in favor of grand jury's powers and
needs).
89 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d 1468, 1475 (4th Cir. 1988) (stating how
civil protective order may impede grand jury investigation). The court, in responding to the
deponents arguments, stated that "[i]t is misguided to contend that the government's ability
to gather other evidence of criminal misconduct undermines this interest. The grand jury
has the right to gather all relevant evidence." Id. at n.10.

GRAND JURY SUBPOENAS BEAT CIVIL PROTECTIVE ORDERS 57
deponents' fifth amendment right against self-incrimination did not require, nor may it depend on, the shield of protective orders." 90 The court
stressed that the deponents had the option of either invoking their Fifth
Amendment privilege or seeking a grant of immunity to protect their interests; otherwise they had waived those rights when they testified in reliance
on the protective order. 9' Furthermore, separation of powers principles and
other statutory restrictions prevent protective orders from acting as de facto
grants of immunity by precluding grand jury access. 92
The court next considered the degree to which protective orders facilitate civil litigation and prevent undue delay by encouraging deponents
to offer otherwise damaging testimony. 93 Because a protective order will
only facilitate litigation to the extent that it can prevent the disclosure of
incriminating information, the court concluded that protective orders' significance is substantially diminished by the potential for leaks, modification, and disclosure at trial.94 Furthermore, protective orders are but one of
many tools that courts can use to encourage
parties to offer testimony and
95
comply with the discovery process.
After discussing and considering the effects on the three primary interests articulated, the Fourth Circuit stated that a court should enforce a
grand jury subpoena "despite the existence of an otherwise valid protective
order. 9 6 In its holding, the court explicitly rejected any balancing test
such as the compelling need rule.97 The Fourth Circuit argued that because
protective orders are issued at the request of a party in an independent civil
action, courts are unable to balance the interests of non-party law enforcement officers.98 Lastly, the court stated that even if it could conduct an
accurate balancing, the inherent unpredictability of such tests would only
90 See id. at 1471 (addressing concerns about deponents' Fifth Amendment rights).
9' See id. at 1471-72 (discussing Fifth Amendment implications of testifying in reliance of protective order). The court further explained that any adverse risks and inferences
of invoking one's privilege against self-incrimination were permitted in civil actions under
various Supreme Court decisions. Id. at 1472.
92 See id. at 1475 (stating giving protective order "paramount effect" would usurp
executive branch's power).
93See id. at 1473 (addressing purpose and function of protective orders in furthering
efficient dispute resolution).
94See id. at 1475-76 (arguing protective orders not absolute thereby lessening significance).
95See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d 1468, 1477 (4th Cir. 1988) (listing alternatives available to district courts).
96 See id. at 1477 (enunciating per se rule favoring grand jury subpoenas).
97 See id. at 1477-78 (rejecting balancing test and stating dangers of ad hoc balancing).
98 See id. at 1477 (stating ad hoc balancing improper at time of issuance of protective
order). The court also argued that the lower courts lack the constitution authority to conduct the proper balancing because "the balancing of the interests of law enforcement against
other needs is properly for the executive department." Id. at 1478.
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encourage deponents to invoke their Fifth Amendment privilege, thereby
undermining the civil litigation system. 99
°°

2. Eleventh Circuit - Williams v. United States"

The Eleventh Circuit has only addressed one case involving the use
of a protective order and a grand jury subpoena, but, like the Fourth Circuit, this court adopted the per se rule. 0 1 As in other cases, the Eleventh
Circuit considered whether to uphold a grand subpoena requesting the protected notes of a deponent's deposition in a prior civil matter. 0 2 In deciding the case, the Eleventh Circuit adopted the per se rule, largely in part
because "the essential and historic purpose served by the grand jury outweighs the utility served by Rule 26(c) protective orders."' 0 3 Emphasizing
the sanctity of the grand jury, the Eleventh Circuit explicitly departed from
the Second Circuit's reasoning in denying that protective orders are the
"cornerstone of our administration of civil justice." 104

In addition to rejecting the compelling need rule because of its improper deference to protective orders and failure to recognize the lack of
power of federal courts to offer immunity, the court also emphasized the
administrative dilemmas that the compelling need rule created.'0 5 Specifically, the court argued that the Martindell court did not adequately define
99 See id. at 1478 (describing functional problems of compelling need rule).
1oo(In re Grand Jury Proceedings), 995 F.2d 1013 (11 th Cir. 1993).
'0'See id. at 1020 (adopting per se rule).
102 See id. at 1013 (stating basic facts of case). Williams, a former insurance salesman, had brought a civil action against his former employer, North American Life Assurance Company (North American), seeking allegedly unpaid commissions. Id. At the same
time though, a grand jury had been instituted to investigate whether Williams had violated
the mail and wire fraud statutes. Id. As would be expected, Williams took part in the depositions in his civil action only when shielded by a protective order prohibiting his testimony
from being disclosed outside of that particular action. Id. Shortly after Williams' action
had been settled, the federal grand jury issued a subpoena for the notes of Williams' deposition. Id.
103 See id. at 1015.

104See id. at 1017 (stating court cannot agree with Second Circuit); see supra note 48
and accompanying text. In elaborating on its disagreement, the court stated:
"Protective orders are merely a facilitating device and should not be used to
shield relevant information from a valid grand jury subpoena. We find absolutely
nothing in Rule 26(c) or its advisory committee notes to support the notion that
Congress, in passing on and enacting the Rule, intended to circumscribe the grand
jury's authority and subpoena power as the [S]econd Circuit has done."
Id.
105See Williams v. United States (In re Grand Jury Proceedings), 995 F.2d 1013, 1018
(11 th Cir. 1993) (stating flaw in applying Martindell standard).
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the terms "improvidence, "compelling need," and "extraordinary circumstances."' 106 Furthermore, the court stated that even with clear definitions,
the Martindell test failed to show how a prosecutor would demonstrate
such needs or circumstances.' °7 Finally, the court hypothesized the
"Hobson's choice" under the Martindell test, whereby judges must decide
order and "denying the public its right to
between violating a protective
10 8
evidence."
man's
every
3. Ninth Circuit - United States v. Janet Greeson'sA Place For Us,
Inc. 109
Most recently, the Ninth Circuit adopted the per se rule in a case involving a grand jury subpoena request for copies of various discovery
documents produced in connection with a prior insurance suit." 0 The civil
suit, which ultimately settled, arose when several medical insurance companies accused the defendant of fraudulent billing practices."
After a
lengthy discovery period, the parties settled the matter and obtained a pro-2
tective order from the district court sealing all discovery documents."
Shortly thereafter, a grand jury subpoenaed the counsel for one of the insurance companies requesting access to all documents produced during
discovery in the prior action." 3 Although the district court allowed the
defendant to intervene and contest the validity of the subpoena's requests,
the court ultimately denied the defendant's motion to quash the subpoena. 14
The Ninth Circuit, in reaching its decision to adopt the per se rule,
reviewed the jurisprudence surrounding both the compelling need rule and
the per se rule, and concluded that the per se rule cases "convincingly explain that a grand jury subpoena should, as a matter of course, prevail over
a protective order."'" 5 In acknowledging the merits of the Fourth and
Eleventh Circuits' decisions adopting the per se rule, the court deferred to
106

See id. at 1018-19 (indicating inability to define "improvidence" and poor explana-

tions of other terms).
107 See id. at 1019 (describing how secrecy required in grand jury proceedings creates
virtual impossibility for prosecutor).
'0' See id. at 1019-20 (describing strategic quandary). The court also described the
potential conflict between different judges that would likely arise when one is asked to
uphold a protective order, and the other to enforce the grand jury subpoena. Id.
109 (In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served on Meserve, Mumper & Hughes), 62 F.3d
1222 (9th Cir. 1995).
'10 See id. at 1222-23, 1226 (stating facts of case and adoption of per se rule).
...See id. at 1222-23 (describing factual scenario leading to appeal).
112 See id. at 1223.
113

See id.

114

See United States v. Janet Greeson's A Place For Us, Inc., 62 F.3d 1222, 1223 (9th

Cir. 1995).
115 See id. at 1226 (summarizing reasons for adoption of per se rule).
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the costly effects of upholding protective orders and the goal of preserving
the grand jury's independence."l 6 Finally, the court added that no language
in Rule 26 indicated Congress' intent to "abrogate[e] the historical investigative powers of the grand jury" or to enable the judiciary to grant immunity.1 17

C. The Modified Per Se Rule
In the five years since the last decision adopting the per se rule, two
circuits have departed from the current trend and created a third standard in
analyzing protective orders and grand jury subpoenas - the modified per se
1 18

rule.

19

1. First Circuit - In re GrandJury Subpoena"

In establishing the modified per se rule, the First Circuit sought to
resolve a conflict created by a protective order and grand jury subpoena
issued in connection with the beating of an undercover police officer by his
fellow uniformed officers. 120 The civil protective order issued in a civil
action by the injured officer against his attackers sealed all confidential
information, including "any and all Internal Affairs Division (IAD) records." ' 21 Several months after a stay in the civil proceedings, a grand jury
investigating the attack issued a subpoena to the victim's counsel, ordering
him to produce all depositions of one of the accused officers. 122 The district court denied the accused officer's motion to quash, utilizing the Martindell standard and concluding123that the interests in facilitating the criminal
investigation were substantial.
The First Circuit, on appeal, rejected both the compelling need
standard and the per se rule, stating that "[a] grand jury's subpoena trumps
a Rule 26(c) protective order unless the person seeking to avoid the sub"6 See id.
117 See id. at 1226-27 (stating further reasons for adopting per se rule).

The court

concluded its discussion of the lack of intent in the language of Rule 26 by stating, "[a]
Congressional intent to cause such a significant shift in the allocation of traditional powers
presumably would have been stated explicitly." Id.
118 See In re Grand Jury, 286 F.3d 153, 158 (3d Cir. 2002) (following First Circuit in
adopting modified per se rule); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 138 F.3d 442, 445 (1st Cir.
1998) (creating modified per se rule).
"9 138 F.3d 442 (1st Cir. 1998).
120 See id. at 443 (stating procedural history of case).
121 See id.
122 See id. Shortly after the grand jury had been initiated, the government intervened
in the civil matter and successfully motioned the court to stay the action, pending the completion of the investigation. Id.
123 See id. at 443-44 (describing district court's reasoning).
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poena can demonstrate the existence of exceptional circumstances." ' 124 In
rejecting the compelling need rule, the court found that the rule was illdefined and misplaced the presumption of validity on the side of protective
orders. 25 Furthermore, the court rejected the per se rule because of its
alleged inflexibility and inability to account for the "idiosyncratic circumstances" that sometimes exist) 26 The court admitted that a grand jury subpractical facpoena will almost always prevail; however, it listed various
127
tors that need to be considered under the new analysis.
128

2. Third Circuit - In re GrandJury

In the most recent example of the conflict between civil protective
orders and grand jury subpoenas, the Third Circuit followed the First Circuit's reasoning and adopted the modified per se rule. 129 As in prior cases,
the grand jury subpoena sought deposition transcripts, interrogatory answers, and other exhibits from a civil proceeding, despite a protective order
limiting public disclosure of personal and corporate financial data. 130 The
district court denied the plaintiff's motion to quash, finding
that the issuing
3
court l~d improvidently granted the protective order.' '
'he Third Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the motion
to quash and agreed with the First Circuit's reasoning requiring a showing

124

In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 138 F.3d 442, 445 (1st Cir. 1995) (enunciating new

approach in resolving conflict).
125 See id. at 444-45 (listing flaw in compelling need rule). "Martindell fails to pay
proper respect to what we deem an issue of great importance: society's profound interest in
the thorough investigation of potential criminal wrongdoing." Id.
126 See id. at 445 (explaining shortcomings of per se rule). Though the court validated
the per-se rule's goal, it stated that the rule's lack of analysis "will trench upon legitimate
concerns when (even if rarely) a solid case can be made for exceptional treatment. Id.
(emphasis added)
127 See id. at 445. The court listed the following factors: (1) the governments's need
for the information; (2) type of criminal charges; (3) potential harm to society of quashing
the subpoena; (4) the positive effects of maintaining the parties confidentiality; (5) the
degree to which maintaining the order will ensure timely resolution of the dispute; (6) potential harm to the party protected by the order; (7) the harm to all other moving parties
involved in the litigation; (8) "and the harm to society and the parties should the encroachment upon the protective order hamper the prosecution or defense of the civil case." Id.
128 286 F.3d 153 (3d Cir. 2002).
129 fee id. at 155.
130 See id. at 156-7 (stating facts of case). Although all protected evidence was produced under a state court protective order, the state court in issuing the order adopted the
term of a prior federal district court order. Id. at 158 n.4. The court's analysis was unchanged because of the similarities in both terms and implicated interests in the orders. Id.
131 See 286 F.3d at 157 (describing district court's reasoning). The court determined
that there were inadequate evidence to support finding of good cause and that the protective
order acted as an overbroad "umbrella" protective order. Id. at 157 n.3.
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of exceptional circumstances to deny a grand jury subpoena.1 32 The court
arrived at its decision after considering the current standards used in resolving the conflict, ultimately favoring the policies supporting both the
per se and modified per se rule.1 3 3 The court agreed with the Fourth Circuit's reasons for adopting the per se rule, but suggested that there might
be situations where displacing a protective order in favor of a grand jury
subpoena would severely harm the public's interest in a timely resolution
of civil litigation.1 34 The court, however, acknowledged "that enforcing a
protective
order grants a certain degree of quasi-immunity to a depo' 13 5
nent."
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Compelling Need Rule Improperly Favors Protective Orders.
The compelling need rule enunciated in Martindell improperly favors efficient dispute resolution via protective orders to the detriment of
the public's interest in effective grand jury investigations.' 36 The inherent
importance of the grand juries in today's society is reflected in their wide
authority to pursue investigations and their right to all relevant evidence. 137
By utilizing the compelling need rule and upholding protective orders in
the majority of cases, courts will impede criminal investigations and marginalize grand juries despite the availability of sufficient alternatives and
the constitutional restraints on grants of immunity. 138 Furthermore, the
protection the compelling need rule gives to protective orders acts as a de
facto use of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, except without any adverse consequences. The justifications for the compelling need rule mistakenly confuse the deference given to protective orders
as necessary to protect a deponent's Fifth Amendment rights. Protective
132
133

See id. at 165 (reviewing holding).
See id. at 158-62 (describing advantages and disadvantages to compelling need rule

and per se rule).
134 See In re Grand Jury, 286 F.3d 153, 159-63 (3d Cir. 2002).
131 See id. at 164.
136 See supra notes 83-89 and accompanying text (describing flaws of compelling
need rule in establishing per se standard); see also supra note 121 and accompanying text
(stating compelling need rule subverts society's interest in criminal investigations).
137 See supra note 121 and accompanying text (deeming interest in criminal investigations paramount concern with rejecting compelling need rule).
138 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d 1468, 1475 (4th Cir. 1988) (stating consequences of upholding protective orders against grand jury subpoenas). Specifically, the
court stated that "a protective order, if given full effect, would impede the investigating
function of a grand jury." Id.
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orders cannot, and should not, be afforded
equal or superior status to the
39
privilege against self-incrimination. 1
By allowing protective orders to prevail over grand jury subpoenas,
district courts are essentially issuing de facto grants of immunity.140 Under federal law, only the executive branch of the government may issue
grants of immunity. 14' Formal or informal attempts by either the legisla142
ture or judiciary to grant immunity constitute a violation of federal law.
Therefore, the deference to protective orders under the compelling need
rule may result in situations where a court upholds a protective order143and
provides a deponent with use immunity, thereby violating federal law.
Notwithstanding a deponent's privacy concerns, viable alternatives
to protective orders exist that encourage the efficient and timely resolution
of civil action.' 44 Specifically, the Fourth and Ninth Circuits have noted
that a court realizing a deponent may invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege can delay discovery until a relevant grand jury investigation has concluded. 145 In certain cases a court may be able to avoid issuing a protective
order if it concludes that the grounds upon which the deponent anticipates
using his Fifth Amendment privilege are invalid. Finally, when the defendant may raise the privilege, a court can shift the burden of proof to the
defendant because the defendant is in the best position to provide such
proof.' 46
B. Any Balancing Test is Unnecessary
Just as the compelling need rule mistakenly utilizes a balancing test
to create a presumption in favor of protective orders, the modified per se
rule does exactly the opposite by creating a balancing test favoring grand
jury subpoenas. 47 Specifically, the modified per se rule would sustain a
139 See supra notes 26-41 and accompanying text (describing how protective orders
are not absolute and how only executive branch can grant immunity).
140 See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
141 See supra note 28 and accompanying text (describing entities authorized to grant
immunity).
142 See supra note 38 (describing how only executive branch possesses power to grant
immunity).
143 See supra notes 43-81 and accompanying text. In fact, to some extent, each case
utilizing the compelling need rule provide parties seeking protection from the order with
some form of immunity. See id.
144 See supra note 91 (stating availability of alternatives to district court).
145 See supra note 14 (suggesting court can stay proceedings until investigation ends);
see also (In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served on Meserve, Mumper & Hughes), 62 F.3d
1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 1995) (summarizing and adding alternatives available to trial courts);
In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d 1468 (4th Cir. 1988) (stating effects of staying proceeding).
146 See supra note 16.

147 See supra note 120-123 and accompanying text (stating modified per se rule).
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protective order when a party to the civil action demonstrates that, among
other things, the public interest in resolving the civil dispute outweighs the
interest in pursuing the grand jury investigation. 48 Although the modified
per se rule recognizes the importance of the grand jury's investigative
functions, the rule requires a balancing of often ethereal interests
that in1 49
evitably leaves some uncertainty in the minds of civil litigants.
There are several major problems with applying any balancing test
50
to the conflict between civil protective orders and grand jury subpoenas.
First, the interests involved are either undeveloped or altogether nonexistent.' 5' Upon application and issuance of a protective order, a corresponding grand jury investigation does not always exist. 52 Although the
litigant's interests in pursuing a protective order are likely fully developed
at the time of issuance (absent an ongoing investigation), the state's interests will remain unclear until a grand jury issues a subpoena. 53 Though
the compelling need rule and modified per se rule create opposing presumptions, they both require some degree of prefigured balancing when a
protective order is involved. 5 4 This balancing is tenuous, if not impossible, when the state's interest is55 left undefined because a grand jury has not
commenced its investigation.1
Second, any balancing test thwarts both the interest of facilitating
grand jury investigations and promoting efficient dispute resolution. 56 By
definition, any balancing test will likely favor either protective orders or
148 See supra note 123 and 130 and accompanying text (listing factors considered
in
analyzing exceptional circumstances); see also Ajit V. Pai, Comment, Should a Grand Jury
Subpoena Override a District Court'sProtective Order, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 317, 340 (1997)
(describing other considerations besides public interests in resolving dispute).
149 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d 1468, 1477-8 (1988) (discussing courts
inability to balance unmaterialized interests); see Pai, supra note 143, at 346 (admitting
problem of uncertainty in modified per se rule).
150 See supra notes 8-12, 94 and accompanying text.
151See supra note 94 and accompanying text (stating inability to properly and accu-

rately balance interests at time of trial).
152 Cf In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1476 (stating practical inability of trial
court to properly balance interests). While the court did not indicate when the grand jury
investigation had commenced, the court stated that there was no attempt by the trial court to
"consult with the United States attorney before entering into a protective order." Id. Without knowing the state's full interest in gaining access to the discovery materials, the court
stated that any balancing at the time of original entry of the order would be ineffective. Id.
153 id.
154 Compare Martindell v. Int'l Tel. and Tel. Corp., 594 F.2d 291, 296 (2d Cir. 1979)

(stating protective order will prevail absent showing of improvidence or extraordinary
need), with In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 138 F.3d 442, 445 (1st Cir. 1998) (stating grand
jury subpoena will prevail unless exceptional circumstances exist).
155 See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
156 See supra notes 8-12 and 18-21 and accompanying text (describing role of protective orders and grand juries).
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subpoenas, depending on the facts of each case. This uncertainty may encourage a deponent to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege even with a
protective order.1 57 While immunity is the only lawful substitute for the
privilege against self-incrimination, the per se rule at least affords the deponent a definitive outcome if a grand jury subpoena requests protected
information. 158
Although the modified per se rule generally results in grand jury
subpoenas prevailing over protective orders, the possibility of an opposite
result under the rule may still delay a grand jury investigation. 59 A deponent anticipating a grand jury investigation may, under the modified per se
rule, seek a protective order, knowing that it would likely delay the grand
jury. 160 Although a protective order may be issued for good cause, the vast
number of orders in today's litigation suggests that a deponent will be successful in obtaining a protective order even without good cause. 161 Even if
the government can overcome the protective order, the deponent will have
succeeded in obtaining his desired delay,
causing needless litigation that
1 62
the per se rule would have prevented.
C. The Per se Rule Should be the ProperApproach
The Fourth Circuit first enunciated the per se rule where grand jury
subpoenas must prevail over otherwise valid protective orders. 163 When a
grand jury subpoena requests protected information or testimony, the per
se rule would, without balancing competing interests, allow the grand jury
subpoena. 64 The deference given to grand jury subpoenas is largely based

157 See supra note 36 (stating deponent may invoke privilege despite existence of
protective order).
158 See supra note 79 and accompanying text (defining per se rule excluding balancing
test). While both the compelling need and modified per se rules create the possibility that
either side may prevail, the per se rule conclusively establishes that grand jury subpoenas
will always prevail. Id.
159 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d 1468, 1478 (4th Cir. 1988) (noting possibility of delay when protective order might prevail).
160 Id.

161 See supra notes 2, 11 and accompanying text (describing standard and prevalence
of protective orders).
162 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1478 (suggesting delay more harmful
when it only protects assertion of Fifth Amendment).
163 See supra note 79 and accompanying text (stating per se rule adopted by Fourth,
Eleventh and Ninth Circuits).
164 See id; see also supra notes 51 and 120 (stating compelling need rule and modified
per se rule). Both rules require to a certain degree the balancing of the public's interest in a
speedy resolution of the civil dispute against the grand jury's interest in obtaining all relevant evidence. Id.
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on the historical role of the grand jury as an investigative
body and any
165
potential harm caused by delaying an investigation.
The certainty afforded to deponents in civil matters who may be
questioning whether to offer their testimony is one of the major positive
attributes of the per se rule. 166 While a protective order by no means a substitutes for a deponent's Fifth Amendment privilege, it ostensibly affords
similar protections by maintaining the confidentiality of testimony or other
discovery materials.1 67 Deponents in civil matters, especially defendants,
arguably consider these benefits of protective orders because asserting
their Fifth Amendment privilege risks creating adverse, but permissible,
inferences. 168
Despite the advantages of protective orders, the deponents' decision
likely depends on whether a protective order will fail when opposed by a
grand jury subpoena. 169 Logically, a deponent will be less inclined to offer
testimony under a protective order if a grand jury subpoena will render it
ineffective later. 170 Although this result is historically consistent with the
imperatives of the grand jury, it is left in doubt under the modified per se
rule and, more so, under the compelling need rule.
Rather than knowing
from the beginning whether a protective order will fail against a grand jury
subpoena, a deponent who testifies in jurisdictions utilizing either balancing rule will run the risk that any offered testimony might later become
exposed to a grand jury. 172 The per se rule eliminates this uncertainty and
gives the deponent a definitive answer if the grand jury demands his pro165 See supra notes 18-25 and accompanying text (describing history, function, and
interests of grand jury).
166 See supra note 79 (stating grand jury subpoenas must prevail); see also In re Grand

Jury, 286 F.3d 153, 163 (3d Cir. 2002) (admitting per se rule provides exceptional degree of
certainty). Specifically, the court admitted that "we recognize the exceptional circumstances rule sacrifices some of the certainty which form on of the most attractive features of
the per se rule. Id.
167 See supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text (proving protective orders not substitute for privilege against self-incrimination); see also supra note 11 (describing purpose
of protective orders).
161

Cf. Ajit V. Pai, Comment, Should a Grand Jury Subpoena Override a District

Court's Protective Order, 64 U. CHi. L. REV. 317 (1997) (providing context of protective
orders in civil matters). Although it is generally accepted that protective orders are not the
equivalent of a Fifth Amendment privilege, "a court may therefore promulgate a protective
order to induce him to testify rather than assert his Fifth Amendment privilege." Id.
169 See Pai, supra note 162, at 346-7 (indicating consequences of testifying considered
by deponents).
170 See id.

171 See supra notes 51 and 120 (describing balancing function involved in compelling
need rule and modified per se rule).
172 Compare supra note 50 (requiring compelling need to overcome protective order),
with supra note 120 (requiring exceptional circumstances to overcome grand jury subpoena).
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tected testimony. 173 The deponent has the clear choice between pleading
the Fifth Amendment and facing the attendant
inferences, or testifying
174
under a potentially limited protective order.
Advocates of the modified per se and compelling need rule often
criticize the per se approach as too rigid and inflexible. 175 Particularly, the
modified per se proponents suggest that in very rare situations "both private parties and the public may be better served by maintenance of the
protective order and completion of civil litigation." 176 This suggestion,
however, is generally made in the context of enormous civil matters that
often have later derivative criminal actions, such as bankruptcy proceedings and mass tort cases. 77 While it may be true that the public has a
strong interest in seeing such civil matters resolved as quickly as possible,
this interest should not come 78
at the expense of the public's stronger interest
in prosecuting criminal acts. 1
Although the per se rule may force a deponent to invoke his Fifth
Amendment privilege and handicap various individuals in their roles as
creditors, tort victims, or investors of the deponent, this does not justify
179
abridging the public's interest in prosecuting criminal wrongdoing.
Moreover, if a deponent invokes his Fifth Amendment privilege in a civil
matter, any inferences will be brought to bear and may actually assist in the
resolution of the matter. 8 °
173See supra note 79, 97 and 106 and accompanying text (adopting per se rule allow-

ing grand jury subpoenas to prevail).
174See Pai, supra note 162, at 346 (admitting uncertainty in modified per se rule). The
uncertainty found in the modified per se rule is inherent in any ad hoc balancing test and is
even more prevalent in the compelling need rule whose standards are still relatively vague.
See Williams v. United States, 995 F.2d 1013 1018 (11 th Cir. 1993).
175See supra notes 122 and accompanying text (describing per se rule as inflexible);
see Pai, supranote 162 at 341 (alleging rigidity one of two major flaws in per se rule).
176 Pai, supra note 162; See also supra note 123 (asserting per se rule failed to account
for "idiosyncratic circumstances").
177See supra note 169 (criticizing per se rule). Among the two cases adopting the
modified per se rule and the law review article cited within, the examples suggested as
appropriate for maintenance of a protective order are catastrophic bankruptcy proceedings,
mass tort cases and savings and loan insolvencies. Id.
178 Cf In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 138 F.3d 442 (1st Cir. 1998) (asserting grand jury
interest will generally prevail). Though the court acknowledged that "society's interest in
the assiduous prosecution of criminal wrongdoing almost always will outweigh" protective
orders, it is exactly this interest that is subverted in maintaining even the most exceptional
protective orders. Id.
179 See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text (summarizing Fourth Circuit's deference to historical role of grand jury).
180 See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 319 (1976) (permitting adverse inferences
of defendant's silence in civil matters). In addition to the permissible inferences, the Fourth
Circuit noted that "where a plaintiff has gathered sufficient evidence to establish a claim
prior to discovery, a defendant who risks incrimination by speaking will inevitably face the
choice of forsaking silence or losing a civil judgment, even if the defendant's silence is not
used againsthim." In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 835 F.2d 1468, 1472 n.4 (4th Cir. 1988).
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Consistency is an advantage where there are competing constitutional issues involving basic fundamentals of the judicial system. Despite
assertions that the per se rule ignores the purpose of protective orders, it
absolutely provides individuals with a definite consequence of giving evidence or testimony under a protective order. 18 1182Consistency and predictability are the practical virtues of the per se rule.
V. CONCLUSION
The courts should adopt the per se approach to review conflicts between civil protective orders and grand jury subpoenas. The historical and
judicial imperatives of the grand jury require courts to accommodate its
investigative purpose whenever possible. Although civil protective orders
help maintain an efficient legal system and often induce reluctant parties to
testify, efficiency concerns and deponents' reliance should not prevail at
the expense of society's larger interest in successful criminal investigations. Furthermore, courts can further the same interests that justify using
protective orders through a variety of discovery tools and procedural motions, thereby obviating the need to quash a grand jury subpoena because
of a civil protective order. Most importantly, allowing a grand jury subpoena to prevail does not implicate a deponent's Fifth Amendment concerns because protective orders are not absolute and because an opposite
result would constitute an impermissible grant of immunity. Courts should
avoid getting involved in the troublesome task of balancing vague and often unformed interests, especially when history and respect for such a venerable institution dictate otherwise.

Brian Baggott

181See supra note 79 (describing per se standard).
182 See supra note 160 (citing certainty as quality of per se rule).

